Spying, Smuggling, and Diversion

Updated May 2010

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan

In many cases, less advanced states obtain what they need for their illicit WMD programs through spying or smuggling goods  from more advanced countries. Oftentimes, the less advanced state secretly misuses items that it received openly and that it probably pledged in good faith to use for non-military purposes. For example, the Soviet Union spied extensively on the U.S. nuclear program during World War II. Its first nuclear weapon was basically a duplicate of the one that the United States dropped on Nagasaki. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Union did have its own design and eventually would have  succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon on its own. Soviet espionage of the U.S. program only served to speed up the process. Non-state suppliers such as Pakistan's Dr. A.Q. Khan have used a variety of unorthodox channels, effectively bypassing national export controls.

Cases Involving Nuclear Weapons

India's first nuclear device in 1974 contained plutonium produced in a Canadian-supplied reactor, which contained a key component supplied by the United States. India had assured the two supplier countries that their exports would be used only for peaceful purposes, but India made a nuclear explosive instead. India called the test a peaceful nuclear explosion, but the world recognized that it had become a nuclear power. In the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan smuggled plans and equipment for nuclear weapon facilities out of the Netherlands, West Germany, and other Western European countries. North Korea also appears to have advanced its nuclear weapons program by misusing (or diverting) a reactor supplied by Russia for peaceful purposes. The DPRK is also accused of proliferating nuclear technology, in particular to Syria, where it assisted in the construction of a nuclear reactor before Israel destroyed the site in 2007. Syria has consistently declined to fully cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency investigators attempting to examine the nuclear site, drawing further suspicion of illegal activity.

In December 2003, Libya admitted to pursuing nuclear weapons by importing enrichment equipment from the Khan network. In exchange for the lifting of some international sanctions, Libya agreed to halt and dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs. In March 2010, the Pakistani government announced its intention to reinvestigate A.Q. Khan, amid reports that the Khan network may have extensively assisted Iran in the development of its nuclear program.

In October 2008, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei warned that given the large number of illicit nuclear trafficking incidents, there is a real danger that potential terrorists could acquire nuclear or radiological materials. This threat has received greater attention worldwide in recent years, culminating in the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. World leaders convened solely to discuss the topic of nuclear trafficking and terrorism, leaving other nuclear issues aside.

Cases Involving Chemical and Biological Weapons

The best-known cases of countries relying on foreign suppliers for help developing chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) are Egypt and Syria.  Both countries benefited from assistance from the Soviet Union and other countries. In addition, during the 1980s and 1990s, Iraq, Iran, and, Libya imported extensive CW equipment and CW-related chemicals (precursor chemicals) from Western Europe.

Further Reading:

	The Washington Quarterly, David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks"
	NTI, Matthew Bunn, "Securing the Bomb"
	Arms Control Today, Leonard Weiss, "Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Network's History and Lesson for U.S. Policy"
	NTI, Shi-chin Lin, "The A.Q. Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls"
	NTI, Sammy Salama & Lydia Hansell, "Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components"
	Arms Control Today, Meredith Lugo and Peter Crail, "ElBaradei Warns of Nuclear Trafficking Threat"
	The Nonproliferation Review, Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt"
	The Middle East Quarterly, Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons"
	Department of State, Nuclear Security Summit
	Yale Global Online, Gregory L. Schulte, "North Korea and Syria: A Warning in the Desert"
	IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic"
	NY Times, Salman Masood, "Pakistan May Investigate Nuclear Scientist's Ties to Iran"
	Multimedia:
	Sky News , "Nuclear Smuggling: War on Terror" (Video)
	YouTube (BBC), "Nuclear Terror Trader, Pakistan: Story of AQ Khan" (Video, Part 1 of 7)
	Frontline, Loose Nukes (Timeline, Maps, Interviews)