Export Controls

Updated January 2010

Export controls are laws, regulations, or treaties designed to halt or restrict the transfer of WMD, and the materials and technology used to make them, between countries. They are vital for nonproliferation because most countries require some level of foreign assistance to develop nuclear weapons or missiles. Countries seeking to develop chemical or biological weapons may also use imported technology. Both multilateral treaties and national export control systems play an important role in controlling the spread of WMD. Complementary international activities, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), seek to work within the limits of national and international laws to strengthen existing export control measures and nonproliferation treaties.

Foreign Government Assistance to WMD Programs

Almost without exception, nations that have developed nuclear weapons have relied on expertise or equipment imported from countries that are more advanced in these areas. The same is true for countries developing missiles. For several countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, foreign assistance was also important for the development of chemical and biological weapons. Such assistance can be obtained through deliberate sharing between countries or through smuggling. Sometimes, the more advanced country provides the assistance deliberately to the less advanced country, in order to help a friend or military ally. For example, Great Britain and the United States cooperated on the development of nuclear weapons during World War II. Today, the United States supports Great Britain's nuclear missile forces. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted China in the early stages of its nuclear weapons program. In the 1950s and 1960s, France assisted Israel in the construction of its Dimona nuclear reactor. Both China and North Korea helped Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and missiles during the 1980s and 1990s. With respect to missiles, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea, among others, have all benefited from foreign assistance. Syria's nuclear program (which is possibly weapons-related) benefited from both Iranian and North Korean involvement, although its progress was largely stalled when Israeli forces struck a potential nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in September 2007.

In July 2005, President Bush announced the creation of a global partnership between the United States and India that would include civil nuclear energy cooperation. This proposed cooperation violated the export guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and required the United States to create an exception to its nuclear export control laws. In December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, lifting U.S. export requirements provided India concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG lifts its embargo on nuclear trade to India (which is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which retains nuclear weapons). In September 2008, the NSG granted a waiver for India from its nuclear trade restrictions.

In 2009, the United States signed an agreement to allow nuclear cooperation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the UAE subsequently signed a deal with South Korea for four nuclear power reactors. The United States is currently reviewing its export control system, with a new, revised plan scheduled to be released in early 2010.

 Non-State Actor Assistance to WMD Programs

For almost 15 years, Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, provided nuclear materials and know-how to several nations. Sources indicate that Khan shared nuclear technology with Iran, North Korea and Libya and made unsuccessful attempts to deal with Iraq. The Khan network is the only documented case of a non-state actor contributing significantly to WMD proliferation. Since the exposure of the Khan network in 2002, the international community has paid more attention to export controls. Moreover, Pakistan adopted new export control regulations for nuclear and biological weapons and delivery systems with tougher penalties for violations. However, in May 2006, Pakistan closed the investigation into the Khan network without prosecuting any individuals involved in the nuclear transfers or allowing Khan to be questioned by the United States. Khan was placed under house arrest in 2004, but the Pakistani government subsequently lifted this order in February 2009.

Concerns have also been raised about China’s lax WMD export controls and the ability of the Chinese government to effectively monitor the practices of private companies. In 2002, the United States imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with chemicals that could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. A year later, similar sanctions were implemented against the China North Industries Group (Norinco) for supplying dual-use missile technology, again to Iran. China has acknowledged that it must try to ensure that nuclear and dual-use technologies supplied to other countries are not used for weapons proliferation. China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in May 2004, and it has adopted new legislation to improve its nonproliferation export control system. In December 2006, China again revised its export control guidelines, indicating a dedication to peaceful end-use of its nuclear technology exports.

Further Reading:

	CRS, Paul K. Kerr, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends"
	Arms Control Association, Export Controls
	CRS, Mary Beth Nikitin, et al., "Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status"
	IAEA, Fritz Schmidt, "Nuclear Export Control: Closing the Gaps"
	CNS, International Export Control Observer
	CNS, Jonathan B. Tucker, "Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s"
	NTI, Dennis Gormley & Lawrence Scheinman, "Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation"
	ACA, Daryl Kimball, "The NSG and Sensitive Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies in the Aftermath of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Deal"
	NTI, Shichin Lin, "The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls"
	NTI, Sean Lucas, "China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group"
	NTI, Aaron Stein, "U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation"
	U.S. GAO, "Fundamental Reexamination of System Is Needed to Help Protect Critical Technologies" (Statement of Anne-Marie Lasowski)
	Multimedia:
	Press TV, South Korea to Build Nuclear Power Plants for The United Arab Emirates (Video)
	UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), Export Licensing (Video)
	Google Video, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Nuclear Weapons Proliferator(Video)
	CNS Seminars, Dr. Frank Pabian, Evidence from Imagery: The Iran and Syrian Nuclear Programs