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Updated February 2010
Introduction
Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapon program in the early 1970s after its defeat and break up in the Indo-Bangladesh war of 1971. Islamabad regards nuclear weapons as essential to safeguard the South Asian balance of power and offset its conventional inferiority and lack of strategic depth against India. The technological complexity associated with nuclear weapons and their systems of delivery is also closely tied to Pakistan's post-colonial identity as the first Muslim nation to have acquired such a capability. There is no reliable, publicly available information to suggest that Pakistan has biological or chemical weapons.
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Nuclear
In the mid-1970s, Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually. According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, estimated in 2007 that the Pakistani arsenal comprised about 60 warheads.[1]
Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is also not party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has linked to its position on the treaty to that of New Delhi's policy on the CTBT.[2] In recent years, Islamabad has sought to strengthen its command and control system, especially since the revelations of the A.Q. Khan network's activities in 2003-04. These measures have also included legislation and organizational initiatives dealing with export control and nuclear safety matters.
Islamabad has also sought its own version of a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement similar to the United States-India nuclear deal, and also for eventual exemption for itself from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) regulations, along the lines of India's exemption in 2008. So far there is no indication that the United States and other members of the NSG would consider such initiatives.
In recent years, Islamabad has sought to strengthen its command and control system, especially since the revelations of the A.Q. Khan network's activities in 2003-04. These measures have also included legislation and organizational initiatives dealing with export control and nuclear safety matters.
The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons from proliferation networks and terrorist and insurgent groups in the country has been a key concern in recent years. Even though officially, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network has been disbanded, suspicions continue in the international community over whether Islamabad has disclosed all relevant information on the network. In addition, the rapid expansion of areas in western Pakistan under control of the Taliban as well as increased terrorist and insurgent attacks in the country have further called into question the security of Islamabad's nuclear facilities and warheads.
Pakistan's oft-repeated official stance is that the Khan network is a "closed chapter" and that all investigations are complete. Moreover it has repeatedly asserted that its nuclear program is under strict control and that it is inconceivable that Taliban insurgents could access or attack its nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. In order to strengthen the security of Islamabad's nuclear weapons program, the United States has provided various levels of assistance to Pakistan.[4]
Biological
While Pakistan is not known to possess biological weapons, it has talented biomedical and biochemical scientists and well-equipped laboratories, which would allow it to quickly establish a sophisticated biological warfare (BW) program, should the government so desire. Indeed, the United States reported in 1996 that Islamabad had been "conducting research and development with potential BW applications." It is not known whether this potential has since been realized. Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 1972 and ratified it in 1974.
See Pakistan Biological Profile
Chemical
Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified the treaty in 1997. Islamabad has apparently made no admission in its treaty-mandated declarations of having possessed chemical weapons. Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed chemical weapons, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program.
Missile
Pakistan is developing both solid- and liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, based extensively on foreign systems. In the early 1990s, Pakistan purchased a small number of 300km-range M-11 ballistic missiles from China; Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan develop the 750km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, which was last tested in October 2002. In the late 1990s, Pakistan also acquired a small number of 1,500km-range Nodong (Ghauri) ballistic missiles from North Korea. As of 2008, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles inducted by Pakistan into its defense services included the Ghaznavi (Hatf-3, range 400 km), Shaheen-I (Hatf-4, range 450 km), and the Ghauri (Hatf-5, range 1,200 km).[3] Missiles under development include the 2,000-2,500 km range Shaheen-II, which was first tested in 2004.
In addition to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are increasingly part of Pakistan's nuclear delivery plans. Its flagship cruise missile is the Babur, which has a range of 500-700 km and was first tested in August 2005. In August 2007, Pakistan tested a second nuclear-capable cruise missile, the air-launched Ra'ad (Hatf-8).
Sources:
[1] Robert S. Norris & Hands M Kristensen, "Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, thebulletin.metapress.com. See also, "Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2006," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, www.sipri.org.
[2] "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan," Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association, November 2007, www.armscontrol.org.
[3] Robert S. Norris & Hands M Kristensen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007"; "Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2006," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
[4] Sharad Joshi & Togzhan Kassenova, "Cooperative Threat Reduction and Pakistan," Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 4, 2008, www.nti.org/e_research/e3_ctr_Pakistan.html.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
